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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
3123, notices to admit were not subject to preliminary attack.92
Because. the draftsmen of the CPLR did not expressly change this
rule, it has, despite criticism, 93 been deemed applicable to CPLR
3123 as well.94
In Nader v. General Motors Corp.,95 plaintiff's notice to admit
consisted of more than three hundred items which the court stated
made it "patently burdensome, unnecessarily prolix, and unduly
protracted."99  The court granted a protective order under CPLR
3103 in order to protect the defendant from the clear abuse of CPLR
3123. The broad language of 3103 was deemed to authorize a
protective order at any time in advance of trial. It was stated that
since the notice to admit is included in the disclosure article, and
since 3103 applies to any disclosure device, a fortiori it was applic-
able to 3123.
ARTICLE 32- ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3216: Departments differ as to retroactivity of amendment.
In Kaprow v. Jacoby,917 the supreme court entered an order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for unreason-
able neglect to proceed as provided in CPLR 3216. On appeal,
the appellate division, second department, found the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint to have been an improvident exercise of dis-
cretion. One of the factors relied upon by the court was that the
defendant had failed to make a demand upon plaintiff to serve and
file a note of issue pursuant to CPLR 3216.
In 1964, the legislature amended CPLR 3216, apparently
intending that no 3216 motion to dismiss could be made until the
plaintiff had received a forty-five day demand to serve and file a
note of issue. However, the Court of Appeals, in Thomas v. Mel-
bert Foods, Inc.,9s held, in effect, that if tie defendant's 3216 mo-
tion were based on "general delay" rather than plaintiff's failure
to file a note of issue, the defendant could circumvent the 1964
amendment to 3216, and the motion could be made without first serv-
92 Belfer v. Dictograph Prods., Inc., 275 App. Div. 824, 89 N.Y.S.2d
125 (1st Dep't 1949); Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 270 App. Div.
700, 62 N.Y.S.2d 440 (4th Dep't 1946), aff'd inem., 296 N.Y. 1014, 73 N.E2d
723 (1947).
937B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3103, supp. commentary 59 (1965).
94 Schwartz v. Macrose Lumber & Trim Co., 46 Misc. 2d 202, 259
N.Y.S.2d 289 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1965). But see 3 WEINsmm,
KoaN & MILEm, NEv YORK CIVIL PRAcTIcE 113103.04, 3123.09 (1963).
95 53 Misc. 2d 515, 279 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1967).
9Id. at 516, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
97 28 App. Div. 2d 722, 281 N.Y.S.2d 591 (2d Dep't 1967).
98 19 N.Y.2d 216, 225 N.E2d 534, 278 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967).
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ing the plaintiff with a forty-five day demand for filing a note of
issue.9 9 The legislative reaction was to repeal CPLR 3216 and
enact a new amendment which provides that as a condition prece-
dent to the making of a motion to dismiss under 3216, the plain-
tiff must be served a written demand requesting him to serve and
file a note of issue within forty-five days and notifying him that
a default in this matter will serve as the basis of a motion to
dismiss for failure to prosecute.109 While this amendment did not
take effect until September 1, 1967, the appellate division, second
department, has sought to comply with the intent of the legislature
by applying its provisions to actions which are commenced and
considered by the court prior to the effective date. 0 1 In the Kap-
row case, the second department reversed the dismissal granted
under 3216 which was based on the general unreasonable neglect
of plaintiff to proceed. While the second department did not refer
to the 1967 amendment in its memorandum decision, the court
did base its reversal, in part, on defendant's failure to make a
forty-five day demand upon plaintiff as provided by the amended
CPLR 3216. Thus, in effect, the second department has pre-
maturely applied the 1967 amendment which makes a demand a
condition precedent to a 3216 motion.
A recent first department case, dealing with a different pro-
vision of CPLR 3216, indicates that the first department is not
applying the provisions of the 1967 amendment prematurely to
actions or proceedings considered by the court prior to the effec-
tive date of the amendment. In Leonard v. Metropolitan Opera
Association, Inc.,10 2 defendant made a motion to dismiss for failure
to prosecute, pursuant to 3216, after plaintiff failed to comply with
defendant's forty-five day demand requesting the plaintiff to place
the action on the calendar for trial. Since this motion was made
approximately eleven months from the day issue was joined, de-
fendant had complied with the 1964 amendment which required
the passing of six months after the joinder of issue before a motion
under 3216 could be made. 10 3  However, the amendment to CPLR
3216, which became effective on September 1, 1967, provides that
a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute may not be made
until "[o]ne year . .. [has] lapsed since the joinder of issue." 104
99 For a full discussion of the history of this matter see generally 7B
MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, supp. commentary 246 (1967) and The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 128, 145 (1967).
100 CPLR 3216.
'
01 For an additional discussion of the Second Department's premature
application of the 1967 amendment to 3216 see 7B McKINNEY's CPLR
3216, supp. commentary 246, 247 (1967).10228 App. Div. 2d 844, 281 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1st Dep't 1967).
203 CPLR 3216.
04 CPLR 3216(b) (1).
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The appellate division, first department, affirmed the order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution."'~
Since the defendant's motion to dismiss under 3216 was made
eleven months after the joinder of issue, the first department, in
effect, held that the 1967 amendment to CPLR 3216, which extend-
ed to one year the mandatory waiting period between the joinder
of issue and a 3216 motion to dismiss, does not apply prematurely
to actions and proceedings which were commenced and considered
by the court prior to September 1, 1967. While the dissent argued
that the spirit of the 1967 amendment should be implemented even
before its effective date to avoid a harsh policy of dismissal, it
is clear that the first department is apparently not applying these
provisions prematurely 1 6
CPLR 3218: Affidavit of debtor in judgment by confession must
state detailed information regarding debt.
In County National Bank v. Vogt,'0 7 plaintiffs appealed from
an order of the appellate term which denied their motion to vacate
a judgment by confession on the ground that the affidavit upon
which it was based was insufficient. In question was the defend-
ant's compliance with CPLR 3218 which provides that a judgment,
either for money due or to become due, may be confessed without
an action upon an affidavit executed by the debtor. Such affidavit
must authorize the entry of the judgment, state the sum for which
judgment may be entered and the county where the defendant
resides. In addition, the affidavit must state the facts out of
which the debt arose and show that the sum confessed is justly
due.10
8
The requirement that the affidavit state facts relating to the
obligation for which the judgment may be entered is designed for
the protection of "third persons who might be prejudiced in the
event that a collusively confessed judgment is entered, rather than
10528 App. Div. 2d 844, 845, 281 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (lst Dep't 1967).
1o6The 1967 amendment to CPLR 3216 provides that no 3216 dismissal
may be sought before a year has elapsed from the joinder of issue. The
1964 provision required only a six-month waiting period before the dis-
missal could be made. The 1967 amendment also serves to reaffirm the
intent of the legislature in 1964 by providing that either the court or the
defendant must give the plaintiff a 45-day demand to serve and file a
note of issue before a 3216 motion to dismiss may be made. This provision
removes the "general delay" ground which was recognized by cases which
held that delay prior to the filing of the note of issue could be considered
on a 3216 motion, despite the fact that the plaintiff had filed a note of
issue within the forty-five days of demand.
10r28 App. Div. 2d 793, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (3d Dep't 1967).
108 CPLR 3218(a).
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